Submission on the International Treaty Examination of the Agreement to Establish the Pacific Resilience Facility
Introduction
1. PILLAR (Protecting Individual Life Liberty and Rights) is a New Zealand civil liberties advocacy organisation with a mission to protect and promote New Zealand’s heritage as a free, liberal and democratic society. A focus on freedom of speech, conscience, religion, thought and inquiry, right to privacy, right of assembly and association, ground our vision for a free New Zealand.
2. PILLAR is in support of ‘The Agreement to Establish the Pacific Resilience Facility (PRF)’ (‘The Agreement’ hereafter).
3. As part of multiple concurrent campaigns, PILLAR seeks to protect New Zealand’s heritage as a free, liberal and democratic society in the face of growing threats of foreign influence, transnational-repression, and transnational-crimes.
Overview and Summary
4. As stated in The Agreement (Article 3), the primary aim is to establish and foster climate-change resilience for Pacific nations. Though PILLAR welcomes initiatives that support climate resilience and environmental flourishing, the focus of this submission is with regards to the secondary purposes outlined in The Agreement, specifically in Article 3aic, and 3b.
5. The establishment of a truly sovereign Pacific region is desirable. Pursuing the UN Sustainable Development goals noted in Article 3(A) as part of the function of PRF has the potential to foster a socially, economically, and institutionally stable, sovereign, secure, and thriving Pacific region. This is of significant value to New Zealand’s long-term security, stability and growth.
6. New Zealand’s democratic institutions (and the stable economy which relies upon it) depends on transparency, independence, and the freedom of elected representatives to act without foreign pressure. This is also true of our regional allies. Yet mounting evidence shows that foreign actors - most notably the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) - are actively attempting to interfere, intimidate, and coerce political, business, and civil society actors within New Zealand and our sphere of influence - particularly in the Pacific region.
7. Strengthening the long-term environmental security of Pacific nations is a critical deterrent to foreign interference. States weakened by environmental disasters must be supported to recover and regain self reliance, not left vulnerable to opportunistic and coercive external influence during periods of fragility.
8. It is therefore primarily against this background that we are in support of the PRF.
First Principles
a. National and regional sovereignty
b. National and regional security
c. Freedom of speech and association
d. Economic development and institutional trust
Context and Background – Defining the Problem
9. China’s growing influence in the Pacific region and exertion of power has hardly been covert in recent years. This has been a cause for concern and instability for us here in New Zealand. Consider in 2025 alone:
a. Diplomatic tensions with the Solomon Islands following agreements with China concluded without New Zealand’s prior knowledge or consultation. (The Herald, 2025)
b. Chinese Ambassador’s letter to Kiwi MP’s condemning their association with Taiwan officials. (The Post, 2025)
c. Director-General of Security Andrew Hampton publicly noting China’s intent to “expand its influence
with Pacific Island countries” across defence, digital, disaster relief, and maritime domains. (One News, 2025)
d. China’s efforts to consolidate influence over Pacific states, including a marked increase in sister-city agreements across the region. (ABC, 2025)
e. CIVICUS reporting concerns over weak human rights institutions in parts of the Pacific, identifying China’s growing influence as a significant risk to civil liberties. (RNZ, 2025)
10. Noted in a recent collaboration paper between the University of Canterbury and Project Sinopsis, a research centre in Prague in the Czech Republic, are the following comments:
a. China has intensified its military posture in the Pacific, demonstrated by the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) conducting unexpected combat exercises in the Tasman Sea in February 2025. This action reflects China’s broader long-term strategy to expand its influence in the Indo-Pacific, which includes pursuing hegemonic ambitions and increasing its presence through infrastructure projects and expanding security ties across Pacific Island nations (Yang, 2025).
b. China’s dual-use facilities in the Pacific, which serve civilian purposes while also supporting military operations, enhance the PLA’s power projection (Yang, 2025).
c. “The question is not whether, but when, China will complete a civil-military logistics system in the Pacific...” (Yang, 2025)
11. Against this backdrop, we support the PRF Agreement as a means of maintaining New Zealand’s regional partnerships and reducing the appeal of China’s increasingly assertive expansionary tactics in the Pacific.
Pacific Sovereignty amidst, US Isolationism and Chinese Expansionism
12. The regional fund aims to reach a USD $500 million capitalisation by December 2026, with New Zealand committing NZD $20 million. Access to this funding will contribute to, and assist in, a crowding out of Chinese investments in the region.
13. New Zealand’s commitment to this agreement is increasingly critical given instability in the United States. The US USD $50 million pledge is unreliable and may not materialise, elevating the importance of New Zealand and Australian leadership to secure influence and prevent the fund from being shaped by states less aligned with liberal democratic values.
Climate response or CCP response
14. PILLAR will reiterate its appreciation that the Agreement’s primary purpose is to strengthen resilience to climate-change risks and the threats posed by increasingly volatile weather patterns.
15. Again, however, the environmental uncertainty cannot be decoupled from the security and sovereignty risks. Pacific nations that are resilient to climate and environmental shocks are less vulnerable to predatory financing and coercive behaviour by illiberal external actors such as the CCP. Strengthening long-term environmental security therefore directly deters foreign interference.
16. Pacific nations must be empowered to exercise full sovereignty over their territories and become progressively less reliant on external financing. We recommend that the Agreement adopt a long-term objective of deploying capital to reduce dependency and strengthen self-sufficiency over time.
17. It is in New Zealand’s national interest to foster Pacific nations as independent, sovereign, secure, and democratic partners over the long term. This should be a guiding vision.
Recommendations
18. PILLAR is in support of The Agreement to establish the PRF. We recommend the following points to be considered in signing the treaty:
a. We recommend that, having secured a voice and a seat at the table, New Zealand exercise a strategic and assertive role in shaping funding decisions, with explicit consideration to China’s expanding influence in the region. This is considering the powers vested in members of the Council under Article 7 of the Agreement.
b. As noted in previous advice, we also believe it to be prudent to delay full disbursement of the NZ$20million pledge until there are clearer evidence of the fund’s financial sustainability and its ability to operate effectively at a lower capitalisation level. This approach is to reflect political and fiscal prudence, not a lack of confidence in the PRF. We therefore also recommend staged instalments rather than as a lump sum payment.
c. As noted already, Pacific nations must be empowered to exercise full sovereignty over their territories and become progressively less reliant on external financing. We recommend that the Agreement adopt a long-term objective of deploying capital to reduce dependency and strengthen self-sufficiency over time.
d. More broadly, we recommend that New Zealand maintain a highly active and sustained presence in the Pacific. Reports suggesting a decline in New Zealand’s aid engagement are concerning. Nature abhors a vacuum, if we and our allies continue to vacate the region, hostile actors will move in – as they already have. Aid to the Pacific is therefore squarely in New Zealand’s national interest and should be treated as a defence and security imperative, not merely ‘goodwill diplomacy’. Future funding of the PRF and aid to the Pacific should therefore recognise this reality.