Submission on the Policing Amendment Bill
PILLAR (Protecting, Individual Life, Liberty and Rights) Submission on the Policing Amendment Bill 2026
To: the Justice Select Committee
Submitted by PILLAR NZ (Protecting Individual Life, Liberty, and Rights)
13 April 2026
Introduction
PILLAR (Protecting Individual Life Liberty and Rights) is a New Zealand civil liberties advocacy organisation with a mission to protect and promote New Zealand’s heritage as a free, liberal and democratic society. A focus on freedom of speech, conscience, religion, thought and inquiry, right to privacy, right of assembly and association, ground our vision for a free New Zealand.
PILLAR supports efforts to enhance operational certainty for New Zealand Police. However, these efforts must not be pursued in ways that increase the risk of police misconduct or enable the misuse of statutory powers and the eventual erosion of civil and democratic liberties - specifically privacy rights.
Overview and Summary
The capacity to capture evidence for the carrying out of Police functions is both beneficial to police and citizens whose day in court can be subject to greater legal scrutiny and clear exercise of justice where evidence (audio, video, image) is provided.
However, the bill in its current form is incredibly loose and open to abuse – PILLAR cannot support this bill in its current form. The powers being granted to police must have sufficiently high guardrails to protect the rights of individuals from undue risks to their privacy, democratic rights, and freedoms. Again, this bill (in its current form) fails to create an effective balance between operational certainty for Police and securing the right to privacy and the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure (NZBORA S21).
The bill, if enacted also puts New Zealand Police at odds with Privacy Act 2020 – the relationship between these two pieces of legislation needs to be more clearly defined given the Police’s unique institutional role as a public entity tasked with law enforcement functions. In its current form, the bill shows little to no consideration for the 13 Information Privacy Principles that govern the collection, handling and use personal information. Two laws that are inconsistent with one another do not provide operational certainty for New Zealand Police, whether on the front line or in supporting roles.
PILLAR has made 5 important recommendations; these are outlined more thoroughly below. These redocumentations include:
Tightening definitions and clauses in section 45A to more objectively tie police’s information gather powers to likely or imminent threats.
Defining the word ‘activity’ used in reference to Police’s functions.
Providing specific conditions for the recording of youth and children.
The establishment of an accessible Police database to allow for effective recording and deletion of recorded materials.
First Principles
Trust – Trust in NZ Police is foundational to the long-term effectiveness and success of Police’s constitutional role as our country’s law enforcement. Vaguely written legislation gives police sweeping and broad powers which plant the seeds for future police misconduct. Such misconduct risks further eroding trust in an institution that (particularly in recent years) has required a meaningful restoration of public confidence. We owe it to our great police officers to ensure that the legislation governing their work does not create or contribute to these long-term risks.
Privacy — Section 21 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act protects the right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure, reflecting a broader commitment to privacy as a foundational right. This principle should serve as the starting point for assessing the bill and cautions against normalising or justifying forms of mass surveillance. While it is true that a wide range of information may be useful for law enforcement purposes, this alone cannot justify the broad collection of data on private individuals. Strong and clearly defined safeguards are therefore essential to ensure that this fundamental right is meaningfully protected.
Operational clarity – Effective policing relies not only on public trust, but also on clear guidance as to what constitutes lawful conduct. Police must be equipped with the appropriate tools and technology to carry out their functions and keep pace with the evolving capabilities of criminal activity. PILLAR recognises the complex and often unpredictable situations officers face, and therefore is sympathetic to the need for a degree of operational discretion in responding to them. For this reason, we do not desire constrain officers or limit their ability to act effectively in the field. However, the legislative and policy framework governing police conduct should be clear, direct, and workable in practice, while allowing for appropriate discretion within well-defined and proportionate limits.
Context and Background | Defining the Problem
The recent court decision on the Tamiefuna case has left Police uncertain about their information gathering powers. This uncertain operating environment should be addressed.
At the same time, the findings of the IPCA (Independent Police Conduct Authority), as well as the Privacy Commissioner regarding cases of unlawful gathering and storage of visual recordings have been a justifiable cause for concern.
In 2022, a ‘Joint inquiry by the Independent Police Conduct Authority and the Privacy Commissioner’ into Police conduct when photographing members of the public generated some key finding:
“Aspects of both Police policy and practice are inconsistent with this framework (of privacy) and breach individual rights.
Officers are routinely taking photographs when it is not lawful for them to do so.
Many officers appear to have very little understanding of the law relating to the retention of these photographs under the Policing Act or the Privacy Act.
Thousands of photographs of members of the public are kept on the mobile devices...not destroyed after there is no longer a legitimate need for them”
These findings cannot be overlooked. In addition, related reports indicate that Police failed to identify and delete tens of thousands of unlawfully collected images across their systems. As noted in the joint inquiry, “Indiscriminate collection of the exact biometric image of a person because it ‘may prove useful’ also means law-abiding members of the public may have their image stored on police systems without the ability to exercise their rights to challenge that collection.”
Analysis - A Balancing Act
We should not rely on the courts or continuous legal challenges to resolve the deficiencies of this bill. The Hansard record of the bill’s first reading indicates that the responsible Minister asserted that sufficient safeguards are in place to prevent mass surveillance. We contest this assessment and question the robustness of the existing safeguards. Moreover, the Minister pointed to the existence of external scrutiny of police conduct, implying that such oversight constitutes an adequate protection against potential misuse of power. No.
It is neither efficient nor responsible to depend on protracted and costly judicial processes (borne ultimately by the taxpayer) to address issues that can be identified and remedied here at the legislative stage. If foreseeable concerns can be resolved now, it is the duty of Parliament to do so. Deferring these matters to the courts represents an abdication of legislative responsibility.
Allowing known or anticipated issues to be settled through future litigation also raises serious concerns about interim harm. It suggests a willingness to tolerate instances of injustice in the short term while awaiting judicial clarification. This is not a position that any government should be comfortable advancing, nor one that is likely to inspire public confidence and trust in New Zealand Police.
Public confidence in policing depends not only on accountability, but on the existence of clear, effective safeguards from the outset. For these reasons, it is essential that all foreseeable issues arising from this bill be addressed proactively, rather than deferred to the courts.
The provisions in clauses 45A–45D are drafted in terms that are overly broad and insufficiently precise, creating a risk of inconsistent application and inadequate accountability. In particular, key phrases such as “integrity of policing,” “intelligence purpose,” and “any other lawful purpose connected with a function or activity of the Police” are effectively circular. Because Police functions are themselves broadly framed, these clauses permit information collection for almost any purpose the Police consider relevant, with no meaningful limiting principle.
It also should be noted that although the Policing Act 2008 defines ‘functions’ of the police, the word ‘activity’ is not defined adding further uncertainty and broad authority to the Police as the word is extensively used in the bill. This should be addressed.
The Bill also relies heavily on subjective tests, such as what a Police employee “considers” or what is “reasonable,” without incorporating objective legal thresholds to support the purpose for which the personal information is collected. This current format weakens safeguards, makes oversight more difficult, and limits the ability of individuals to challenge the use of these extensive powers. The inclusion of a catch-all provision in clause 45A(d) further undermines any intended constraints.
Clauses 45B and 45C substantially expand police recording powers by authorising the recording, “by any means,” of any person, object, or sound in public spaces, as well as on private property where police are lawfully present.
Notably, these powers are not constrained by any explicit requirement of necessity, imminence, or proportionality. This constitutes a significant extension of surveillance authority without the introduction of corresponding safeguards.
Importantly, the current breadth section 45A has consequential implications on serval other clauses. Because section 45A is drafted in expansive and general terms, all consequent provisions that rely upon or incorporate it (45B-45E) inevitably inherit its wide, catch-all character. As a result, the reach of clauses such as 45B and 45C is amplified beyond what may have been intended.
Therefore, a greater precision in the drafting of section 45A would have a flow-on effect in narrowing the scope of related provisions and ensuring that the overall framework is more precisely targeted. Tightening the definition and limits within section 45A is not merely a matter of improving a single provision, but of strengthening the coherence and proportionality of the bill as a whole.
Finally, although clause 45D appears to impose limits on intelligence gathering, the threshold that information “will or may support” Police activity is low and speculative, and the requirement of “reasonableness” remains undefined. As a result, this provision offers only no reliable practical constraint on Police’s information gather powers.
Recommendations
The possible recommendations to improve this bill and police’s relationship to information gathering, retention and use of data are almost endless with extensive possibilities available to improve Police’s operations. We direct the committee to consider the extensive recommendations made in the Joint inquiry by the Independent Police Conduct Authority and the Privacy Commissioner into Police conduct when photographing members of the public.
More specific to this bill, PILLAR makes the following recommendations:
The language in this bill needs to be tightened to reduce the subjective nature which enables broad powers to police without objective limits. When photographing or video recording an individual for general intelligence purposes, an officer should be able to point to a reasonable basis, beyond mere speculation, for believing that the material collected will be relevant to a specific or probable investigation, or imminent threat.
Officers should only gather information if they have reasonable concerns that a person’s behaviour poses a clear, articulable, likely or potentially immanent threat, or is obstructing officers in the carrying out of their functions. Specifically, section 45A should be reworked to reflect these principles and recommendations.
Collection of data should also be done with due consideration to New Zealand’s Information Privacy Principles. This pursuit does not need to create extensive policy measures that complicate police’s activities. Information gathering powers should be exercised in relation to a specific, targeted, explainable investigation or likely threat.
The use of the word ‘activity’ to either be removed or defined. If Police ‘activity’ is equal to Police ‘function’, then the use of the word activity is made redundant. If, however, these are intended to have different meanings, the word activity must be clearly defined. Defining this word will place clearer boundaries on the powers which Police are allowed to exercise. Failing to define the word ‘activity’ adds a new layer of subjectively defined powers to police.
In its current form, the bill provides no guidance or restrictions regarding the recording or collection of material involving youth and children. We therefore recommend that it be amended to include specific conditions governing such recording, with a higher threshold than that applied to the general adult population.
Beyond the scope of this bill, further recommendations should be directed to New Zealand Police regarding the retention and storage of recorded material. Current limitations may hinder the ability to efficiently locate, access, and utilise information once it has been collected.
Accordingly, the development and implementation of a comprehensive digital evidence management system should be prioritised. Investment in such a system would support the effective organisation, retrieval, and use of recorded data for legitimate policing purposes, while also strengthening accountability and oversight.
Conclusion
PILLAR supports the general aim of this bill. Police require certainty about their rights in the carrying out of their law enforcement resposponsibilities. This can be achieved in a manner which does not pose long run threats to the privacy of New Zealanders or threatens long term trust in Police as an institution. The implementation of recommended amendments will support the balancing act that is required to pass effective and functional legislation that does not threaten the civil liberties and democratic rights of New Zealanders.