Request for action on foreign interference risks in NZuniversities

1. PILLAR (Protecting Individual Life Liberty and Rights) is a New Zealand civil liberties advocacy organisation with a mission to protect and promote New Zealand’s heritage as a free, liberal and democratic society. A focus on freedom of speech, conscience, religion, thought and inquiry, right to privacy, right of assembly and association, ground our vision for a free New Zealand.

2. As part of multiple concurrent campaigns, PILLAR seeks to promote policies which protect New Zealand against growing threats of foreign interference, transnational-repression, and transnational-crimes.

3. I write on behalf of PILLAR following the publication of the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service's New Zealand's 2026 Security Threat Environment assessment and, in particular, its warnings concerning foreign interference, espionage and the vulnerability of New Zealand's universities and research institutions.

4. The assessment should prompt serious examination of how New Zealand universities manage relationships with institutions that are linked to, funded by, or subject to the direction of foreign states.

5. NZSIS states that New Zealand's universities and research institutions need to remain alert to attempts by foreign states to acquire technology capable of being repurposed for military development. It warns that the open and collaborative character of New Zealand academia, and the cutting-edge technology developed within our universities, can be exploited under the banner of cooperation or partnership.

6. It further states that while academic exchanges and talent recruitment programmes are commonplace and overwhelmingly legitimate, some states use such programmes to covertly and illicitly access intellectual property and technology and to disguise the involvement of military or intelligence agencies.

7. These are not abstract risks. NZSIS also reports that the People's Republic of China is the only country it has detected conducting espionage against New Zealand at scale. The assessment's foreign-interference findings raise additional concerns.

8. NZSIS reports efforts by foreign states and their proxies to influence communities, suppress dissent, control information and build influence through deceptive, corruptive or coercive means. It warns that New Zealanders can deliberately or unwittingly act in the interests of foreign states, including through self-censorship.

9. Against this background, PILLAR believes there is a legitimate public-interest question about the continued presence of Confucius Institutes within New Zealand universities.

10. Confucius Institutes describe themselves as organisations promoting Chinese language and cultural exchange, and Chinese language education is valuable to New Zealand. The question is not whether New Zealand should engage with China or teach Mandarin. It plainly should.

11. The question is whether language and cultural programmes situated within New Zealand public universities should operate through institutional arrangements involving foreign-state-linked partners at a time when our own security service is explicitly warning that academic partnerships, exchanges, financial leverage and other ostensibly legitimate relationships can be exploited by foreign states.

12. International experience warrants attention. In Australia, six universities had closed their Confucius Institutes by April 2025, including the University of Melbourne, University of Queensland, UNSW and University of Western Australia. The Australian Government has subjected these arrangements to heightened scrutiny amid longstanding concerns about foreign interference and academic independence. Seven institutes nevertheless remained open at that point, so the Australian experience is one of substantial contraction and increased scrutiny rather than a complete nationwide closure.

13. PILLAR believes New Zealand should now conduct its own transparent assessment rather than assume that arrangements established in a different security environment remain appropriate today. We therefore ask:

I. Following the 2026 NZSIS assessment, have you sought advice on risks to academic

freedom, research security or institutional independence in these arrangements?

II. What information does the Government hold on funding, staffing and resources

provided by foreign-state-linked entities to these institutes?

III. Is the Government considering stronger rules for managing foreign-state relationships

in publicly funded tertiary institutions?

14. PILLAR’s position is that New Zealand universities should urgently review, tighten oversight of, and seriously consider ending Confucius Institute arrangements where required in light of contemporary foreign interference and research security risks.

15. Ending a particular institutional arrangement would not mean disengaging from China. New Zealand can encourage Chinese-language capability, China expertise, student exchange and legitimate academic cooperation. But those objectives do not require New Zealand universities to outsource or share institutional control over cultural and educational programmes with entities connected to another state.

16. Parliament has already recognised the seriousness of this wider problem. The Crimes (Countering Foreign Interference) Amendment Act 2025 introduced offences concerning improper conduct for or on behalf of a foreign power that compromises protected New Zealand interests. The 2026 NZSIS assessment now makes clear that universities and researchers are part of the environment in which these risks must be managed.

17. In recognition of this growing issue, National Party MP Tim van de Molen, has recently entered the Foreign Influence Transparency Bill (drafted by our team here at PILLAR) into Parliament’s Members’ Bills Ballot.

18. Public confidence in our universities ultimately depends upon their intellectual independence. PILLAR believes New Zealanders deserve clear assurance that the institutions charged with developing knowledge, educating future leaders and conducting sensitive research are protected from inappropriate foreign-state influence.

19. We would appreciate your response to the questions above and would welcome the opportunity to discuss how New Zealand can strengthen the resilience and independence of its university sector.